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MIDNIGHT TRAIN TO US,
Ann C. Scalest
You're catching me at a funny, introspective time, between
projects, so to speak. Just last week I signed off, as they say in the
law review biz, on a manuscript entitled Militarism, Male Dominance,
and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?.2 It was about how law
and militarism are intimately related, how militarism and male dom-
inance are intimately related, and how feminism is inconsistent with
all of them. The legal work and the analysis and the making of my
argument are done. What you're hearing today is the residue in my
brain, the swimmy thoughts I've been left with, a commentary on par-
ticipating in the enterprise of feminist legal theory. I want to speak
today from the heart, as Nixon used to say. I want to talk about the
possibility of being happy as a lawyer. The pathology I describe is
my own. But because I suspect that law school is the domain of the
self-hater, maybe there is something here you can use.
I came to law from philosophy. I was always drawn to abstrac-
tion and systemization. Law was an attractive career for a philoso-
phy student. It has nearly the same intellectual appeal. Law is
applied philosophy of a sort, but better than "pure" philosophy in
two ways. First, it is not ag rigorous; it has no requirement of logical
consistency. Indeed, for law to work and move, it can't be logically
consistent. Second, though philosophy in my opinion has amazing
persuasive power (ideas matter), there are no winners or losers. In
law, at least theoretically, if you've got the best argument, you win,
and the world changes. Law is second-rate philosophy backed by
the force of the state.
I was impatient for the world to change, as I was forged in the
sixties. It was an ambivalent time to choose to become a lawyer.
Vietnam changed the way we think about law and undermined any
I Copyright © Ann C. Scales 1990. This is the text of a speech to the Feminist
Jurisprudence Symposium at Cornell Law School, March 4, 1989. Many women's voices
are heard throughout, and I would like to call their names: Anne Simon, Gwyn Kirk,
Rheba Rutkowski, Frankee Nesta, Roz O'Reilly, Lily Tomlin, Jane Wagner, Clare
Dalton, Aretha Franklin, Catharine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, the women of the
Cornell Law School. Most of the footnotes here are parts of the text I cut out just before
the speech or as I was going along in order to save time. I have added other footnotes
and citations only where absolutely necessary.
t Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law.
2 Ann C. Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymo-
ron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 25 (1989).
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residual faith in the constitutional qua constitution. It exposed the
Realpolitik of our structure of government: the executive branch
runs everything; the Congress manages public opinion by farting
away its energy; the judiciary primarily sits back and says, "hey, this
is all legitimate, this is what makes the U.S.A. great." Those of us
who made the choice to become lawyers then had to have known we
were devoting our lives to a largely cynical enterprise, but I thought
I was ready for it.3
But law school really did a number on me. I fed right into the
law school trip, into Duncan Kennedy's description of how law
school systematically takes potential ethical and political actors out
of those arenas by de-moralization. 4 On the intellectual level, what I
learned in law school was this: oh, law is much more complicated
than you think it is. It is consistent, it does make sense. If you don't
know the answer or if you don't know why we're talking about what
we're talking about, its just you. You, alas, are not Holmes. You
haven't learned enough. You'll need to spend the rest of your life
studying even to begin to understand how it all fits together.5
Politically, the lesson of law school was this: government is im-
portant, law is important, you therefore have a really important job.
The hierarchy, harshness, and slow movement of the law are all nec-
essary and fair. So go to it, and accept the big bucks as just compen-
sation for the frustration you will encounter.
I was in a serious downward spiral, ending up on Wall Street.
I've indulged for years in the standard rationalizations about that.
Some of them may have some validity in some cases. But while I
still have your attention, let me take the opportunity to urge you not
to go to work for a big firm. There are three reasons not to, as listed
by the wise and, I think, happy lawyer Anne Simon:6 (1) you get
used to the money; (2) you're helping them; (3) you learn bad hab-
S Coming from the sixties, I have recently realized, had a personally disabling ef-
fect on me. One of the lessons of the sixties for teenagers, from the slaughter of Viet-
nam to the killing of Bobby Kennedy, was "only the good die young." The negative
implication of this lesson was if you didn't die, you were not good, or tender-hearted, or
really idealistic, or committed, or at least not sufficiently so. The best you could hope
for was to make the world safe for the good.
4 Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Trainingfor Hierarchy, in THE POLrrIcs OF LAW
40 (David Kairys ed. 1982).
5 I think law teachers often at least implicitly believe this. They are, in spite of
twentieth-century efforts to de-mystify the law, very much engaged in the pursuit of
Right (Legal) Reason. The conviction that the dispositive tests can be found in legal
literature is part of what gives the study of law its monastic character. I suspect that in
the end, this learned conviction is a defense against creeping cynicism, as in: given a
room full of shit, there must be a pony in there somewhere.
6 I am grateful to Anne Simon for talking about this with my Feminist Legal The-
ory class at Boston College Law School in the Fall of 1988. The text here is an applica-
tion and elaboration of her insight.
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its. I wasn't around big firm practice long enough to get used to the
money. But I did help them. I was part of the crackerjack kamikaze
associate troops who got the Ford Motor Company out of a real
scrape in the Pinto cases. I can't say I'm proud of that.
And I learned lots of bad habits. I learned how to do things the
most expensive way possible. As an associate, pursuing to death a
little piece of someone else's case, I learned very little about very
little. I learned that legal judgments are the end of the matter, the
end of the relationship with clients and their aspirations. I learned
that lawyers are free to walk away from someone else's time and
money, badly invested. And I learned that it has to be that way-
that practicing law is necessarily an expensive and exhaustive ac-
cumulation of details and delays, which may or may not get any-
where or mean anything.7 I've worked hard to unlearn my big firm
bad habits and to recover from the experience. I would say I'm very
lucky, but my witch friends say to give myself and the goddess a little
credit. My spirit survived.
Teaching more or less happened to me. It was incredibly good
news for me that contemporary feminist jurisprudence also hap-
pened. I fell into a new field, into its construction from the ground
up. It is wildly exciting to be able to have this community, to know
these distinguished women, to participate in something that at least
seems to be living. The bad news is that, as a law teacher, I am still
helping them. I'm a good teacher. I can clearly and efficiently train
people to do lawyerly evil clearly and efficiently. And even when my
students avoid those pitfalls, I wonder how many fine young minds
am I helping to send off to be wasted as lawyers.
Well, you're wondering where the women's peace movement
comes in.8 I was in the midst of the crisis of conscience when I vis-
ited London in the winter of 1984. There I first learned about the
Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp. It captured my imagi-
nation and set me on fire. I'm an admirer of the efforts of the wo-
men at the Seneca Camp nearby.9 My own experience, however, has
7 Contrary to some feminist criticisms of law and legal education, I don't think that
law school taught me to be a cut-throat adversarial person. Law school may do that to
some people, but I think I already was that way. I was impatient for the world to change,
and prepared to force them to be free. Law is, after all, about social policy backed by force.
Insofar as there is a meaningful division between nonviolent activism and armed strug-
gle, I suspect lawyers like me tend more toward the armed struggle camp. We are
soldiers of a sort, only very inefficient ones.
8 In the Cornell Law School publicity, this lecture was called "The Women's Peace
Movement and Law."
9 The oldest continuous women's peace camp in the U.S. is (along with Ithaca) in
the Finger Lakes region, near the U.S. Army Depot at Romulus, New York. For further
information, write Women's Encampment for a Future of Peace andJustice, 5440 Route
96, Romulus, New York 14541.
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to do with Greenham, so I will recount a brief history. In September
1981, a small group of women and children and a few men marched
from Cardiff, Wales, to United States Air Force (USAF) Greenham
Common near Newbury, England to protest the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization's (NATO) plans to deploy Cruise missiles
there. Their intention was simply to stimulate public debate about
this, as there had been none in Britain. It was a NATOfait accompli,
to be effectuated and controlled entirely by the United States. The
women planned to protest for a few days, but getting insufficient
publicity, they stayed. The Cruise missiles were deployed in No-
vember 1983. There are ninety-six of them there now, each a first
use weapon, each with the fire power of sixteen Hiroshimas.
The women's protest became a permanent encampment
outside the base-for eight and a half years now, round the clock,
winter and summer, braving the vissicitudes of the brutal British
eighties. They have been evicted and have had to relocate on an
average of five times per week. There have been well over a thou-
sand civil disobedience prosecutions of them and many jail
sentences. But they have "won." Those ninety-six missiles are
among those to be "destroyed" under the Intermediate Range Nu-
clear Force (INF) treaty. 10
The Greenham women will never get any official credit for that,
and I didn't know in 1984, didn't imagine, that their sanity could
prevail over Cruise insanity. But I was lit up even then. Because,
unlike the projects of lawyers, theirs wasn't an expensive campaign,
indeed it was predicated on the possibility that they could just live
there, reliant on the kindness of strangers, and be their politics. Un-
like law, they weren't stuck with the task of attacking tiny parts of
tiny problems. They were attacking the biggest problem there is,
and all at once. And most important, there is no possibility in the
Greenham campaign of walking away. For Greenham is not just a
place but a movement. It is about peace in the broadest sense. It is
about the interconnections between nuclear and other forms of
male violence and male organizations. It is about the interconnec-
tions between these and starvation. It is about the future being de-
pendent on a blend of passionate politics and humility. The INF
treaty is just the first victory, the beginning of the struggle. The
Greenham women aren't going anywhere. As the banner over one
10 S. ExEc. RP. No. 15, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). Publicity surrounding the
treaty spoke of destroying the Cruise missiles. However, the only components of the
weapons to be destroyed are the missiles themselves, the vehicles for the warheads. The
warheads and/or "weapons grade radioactive materials" will be disassembled and saved
for use in the emerging generations of weapons. The rumor in Albuquerque, New Mex-
ico, is that some of these things will be stored inside the nearby Manzano mountains, a
place of enormous beauty that is also sacred to local Native American peoples.
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of the Greenham camps the day after the treaty signing read,
"HERE TO STAY, HERE TO VERIFY."
The magic for me in the Greenham movement is that it is an
example of women having an unmediated relationship to their reality,
to history itself. For centuries, women's intelligence and politics
have been imprisoned in the home, surviving, as Andrea Dworkin
says, on crumbs brought by fathers and husbands and brothers. 1
But here at Greenham were women taking history by the horns and
refusing to abide by history's exhaustion of remedies requirements.
Just as men have always earned political authority by leaving home
for war, here were these women, leaving home for peace. A Greenham
friend summed this up in regard to a very famous photograph of
Greenham women dancing on a missile silo.12 The action during
which that photograph was taken got a lot of publicity, and on New
Year's Day, 1983, that photograph was taken up by the press all over
the world. My friend told me that on that day, for the first time in
her life, she wished she had a television. For once it would show
something important, and for once it would be about us.
It was so exciting. For most women this has not seemed possi-
ble. Not only is women's reality mediated, our political judgments
are subjectivized, turned into personal problems. This is both an
external and internal phenomenon. Internally, we learn that the
problems are too big for us, we should leave them to the experts,
and if we're still dissatisfied it'sjust us. We need some self-actualiza-
tion therapy and some shopping to help us feel better. We focus on
ourselves, so do not excise what Russell Jacoby calls the "scar tis-
sue" of the human history of violence.' 3 The world of politics be-
comes "other," and must be obliterated. And so we are disabled
from acting. We fall for what Jacoby calls "the fetish of
subjectivity."' 14
When we do act, our political actions must be trivialized by ex-
ternal means. I gave some examples of this last night. 15 It always
11 ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 38 (1983).
12 The photograph, taken by Raisa Page, is reprinted among other places in ALICE
COOK & GWYN KIRK, GREENHAM WOMEN EVERYWHERE 52-53 (1983).
13 See RUSSELLJACOBY, SOCIAL AMNESIA: A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOL-
OGY FROM ADLER TO LAING (1975).
14 Id at 40.
15 The first example is the case that led to the development of the problematic
"battered women's syndrome" defense. In State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d
548 (1977), a woman killed a man who had threatened some children and molested one
of them. The Washington Supreme Court reversed her murder conviction on the
ground, inter alia, that the equal protection clause requires that the jury be allowed to
consider her subjective impressions of the situation, and her unequal physical strength.
Id. at 558-59. This can be seen as subjectivization and trivialization of women's percep-
tion of oppression, because "[t]he Wanrow court did not take the next step; to consider
whether the objective self-defense standard embodies a male standpoint." Catharine
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happens to women, and it always happens to all people who speak
out against war: they, after all, stand in the shoes of women. To call
conscientious objectors effeminate is the best way to silence them
and minimize their numbers. The same thing happens with civil dis-
obedience prosecutions. The Thoreauian formula says civilly diso-
bedient citizens have to suffer the punishment. It means that they
must pay for divergent subjectivity; it means they weren't objective,
they were silly and arrogant and wrong.
We can't cave in to that. I love the Greenham women because,
though working with two strikes against their credibility (as women
and as peace activists), they never caved in to anything. They
wouldn't obey court orders to leave, they forced arresting police to
talk about what their wives thought of them, they refused to pay
fines, they put the police and judges and the military on trial in the
courtroom, they sang and chanted through their own trials, they
subverted the other jail inmates, they broke into the jails and danced
on those roofs, and upon release they were all right back out there.
It was surely an important lesson for me, to be forced to see the
narrowness of my lawyerly view of the world. But there came to be a
downside to that lesson. I began to wonder, does it always have to
be that hard to be part of history? The peace-activist women I met
seemed to me to be so serious, so single-minded, so intent upon a
consistent feminist politics and process. And I didn't think they ap-
proved of me. I hadn't lived in the mud for eight years, and, being a
lawyer, I was pretty clearly from the other side, an emissary from the
belly of the beast. In working on that project since 1987, I some-
times felt like a plaintiff's malpractice lawyer at a convention of the
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. I felt that I had to work
harder at it, so I did. I was living and breathing nuclear war, and its
connections to absolutely everything. I found myself thoroughly
redefining "fun." I questioned all of my judgments. I couldn't lis-
ten to Gladys Knight sing "Midnight Train to Georgia," because it
MacKinnon, Toward FeministJurisprudence, 34 STAN. L. REv. 703, 725 n.96 (1982) (empha-
sis deleted).
The Washington court clarified its view of women in a later case. A woman was not
allowed even to try to prove sexual abuse by her father on the ground that the harm was
too subjective, therefore unverifiable, despite expert psychiatric testimony. Tyson v. Ty-
son, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986) (refusal to apply "discovery rule" to toll
statute of limitations).
The last example is Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F.
Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), afl'd, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985). When the Greenham
women came to this country to demonstrate the illegality of the deployment of Cruise
missiles in England, they were thrown out of court pursuant to the political question
doctrine. United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani argued that they had vastly oversim-
plified defense matters (girls are dumb), and that their real problem was that they didn't
know how to cope in a necessarily dangerous world (girls are fluffy).
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was sentimental and politically incorrect for her to rather live in his
world than be without him in hers.' 6 I seriously considered giving up
teaching and law and becoming a peace pilgrim.
Now I see that it wasn't women in the peace movement laying
this trip on me. It was my self-hater talking. I was judging my in-
sides by their outsides. I had embarked on a fetish for myself which
was the opposite of the fetish of subjectivity. Not opposite in the
sense of being a fetish of objectivity, because that, after all, is the justi-
fication of male dominance. Rather, I thought, maybe this is a fetish
of politics: a view whereby the self is defined and the self's existence
justified solely or primarily in terms of political activity and political
correctness. In this view, there is still a dichotomy between the per-
sonal and the political, between self and world. There is still annihi-
lation of some "other." But in this view, the world trumps other
interests. The work to be done trumps fun, taking care of oneself,
intimate relationships, and other "non-political" activities.
I felt like a monster. The categorization of everything, the ob-
jectification of some, and then obliteration of those "others" is a
tidy approach to life. It is what the brutality of patriarchy is all
about.' 7 The fetish of politics I describe has the same structural de-
fect. Women can recognize and practice connectedness, but still fall
for some hierarchy of loves, among self-love, love of others, and
love of politics. There has to be some dialectical middle ground
somewhere, or better yet, some way of understanding
self/others/world that requires no categorization.
Achieving this healthy relationship among self, others, and
world is a very tough mission. There is strife in personal relation-
ships. As Adrienne Rich says, two people together is a miracle.' 8
There are immense difficulties that arise among people of different
cultures. In my state of New Mexico, the coexistence of Indian and
Hispanic and Anglo peoples is a miracle. The authorities tell us that
there is inevitable conflict among different sovereigns. That the
world still exists is, indeed, a miracle.
Feminist theory discloses a particularly poignant struggle with
the tension between individual and community. I have found it to
be best explained in Robin West's wonderful article, Jurisprudence
16 Jim Weatherly, Midnight Train to Georgia, (© Eric Records 1971).
17 This approach is socially sanctioned for men. It is said that in his youth, Teddy
Roosevelt discovered that bringing down five starlings with a single blast of his shotgun
cured him of his asthma. Therefore, Roosevelt considered war from the perspective of
the tonic physical and moral effect it would have upon him. It led to his "splendid little
war" in Cuba that was to keep the nation from lapsing into effeminacy. Thanks to my
wonderful friend Margaret Monsell for the anecdote.
18 Adrienne Rich, Love Poem No. XVIII, in THE DREAM OF A COMMON LANGUAGE 34
(1978).
716 [Vol. 75:710
MIDNIGHT TRAIN TO US
and Gender.19 The "official" story about women's lives is that told by
"cultural feminists": for women, connection is existentially and
morally prior to individual autonomy. The official harm women face,
therefore, is the harm of separation. The downside, or unofficial
version, of this is that told by radical feminists: women's connected-
ness is the source of women's oppression. Intimacy becomes intru-
sion. The unofficial harm women face, therefore, is the threat of the
dissolution of our individual boundaries. In Robin's words, we
"secretly wish that everyone would get the hell out of our lives so
that we could pursue our own projects."' 20 This desire is not for
mere solitude or individual achievement. Rather it is the residue of
a long history of women's invisibility. I don't fear that my selfiess
will be silenced; rather that I will never have a self. I fear that I can
never heal from my internalized non-personhood. 21
As an example of this struggle, consider the fortunes within the
feminist community of Carol Gilligan's book, In a Different Voice. 22
You will recall that Gilligan's book described her findings that little
boys tended to address moral problems in a hierarchical, rights-
based, formalistic way. Little girls tended to address the same
problems in a contextualized, relationship preserving, equitable
way. When this book was published in 1982, we fell over ourselves
to embrace it. Very soon after that wave of acceptance, there was an
equally large wave of suspicion, some outright rejection. 28
19 Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
20 Id. at 36.
21 West distinguishes this from a more familiar, masculine version of the tension
between individual and community expressed in the legal system. From the male point
of view, the official value of law, represented by traditional legal liberalism, is autonomy.
The official harm threatened by existence in society is annihilation of the self. What
West calls the "unofficial story" is that told by critical legal studies. The individual val-
ues autonomy, but has a perpetual longing for connectedness. The harm he fears is
alienation, loneliness, and isolation. Id. at 7-12.
The stories for men and for women are not just mirror images of each other. The
subjectivity craved by spokesmen for the unofficial male story is not the same subjectivity
depicted by cultural feminists. They value intimacy because it helps them overcome
their separateness-intimacy is hard for them. For us it is "ridiculously easy." Likewise,
liberals fear annihilation from without. Women's is a fear of annihilation from within; a
fear of having my emerging self overcome, not ended. Id. at 40-41.
22 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
23 The criticisms were of different types. Feminists in the social science community
criticized Gilligan's methodology, though in fairness to her, she admitted the limitations
of her small samples and disclaimed any intention to make any generalizations. Some
liberal feminists thought her work gave away our hard-fought gains in the area of equal-
ity. I argued that the book was dangerous because it was so popular, and its findings so
easily generalized and co-opted. I see this in various law school curricula: a few pages
of In a Different Voice get assigned sometime in the first year, usually as a way of opening
the subject of alternative dispute resolution. So we leap to suggest that somehow wo-
men's voices can be incorporated into a thoroughly incompatible male scheme, without
fully discussing the pathology of that scheme. So Gilligan's observations get lost. As
1990]
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But in spite of this critical storm, Gilligan's work has shown
amazing staying power. It just hit too close to home. As Robin
West says, "I don't know of any woman who hasn't recognized her-
self somewhere in this book."24 So the task is to use Gilligan's in-
sights without being demoralized by criticisms. Yes, it is dangerous
to institutionalize a "women's point of view," without due diligence
to thwart those who would exploit these findings. Yes, it is cultural
imperialism to discuss a women's point of view without regard to
race and class. Yes, it is possible that the nurturing, relationship-
boundedness that women express is a result of violent inculturation
into the system of dominance and submission. And, yes, women
have learned to use nurturing as a means of manipulation. But that
doesn't make the values expressed by women in Gilligan's book bad
or unimportant or unnecessary to the survival of the planet. It just
makes them heretofore unchosen. We need to choose them now.
As Robin West-she certainly no fluffy sentimentalist-says, "I can't
imagine any project more crucial, right now, to the survival of this
species than the clear articulation of the importance of love to a
well-led public life." 25
Now let me bump this discussion into the realm of law and
lawyering. A lot of mainstream jurisprudence focuses on the nature
of the obligation to law, both the immediate obligation to obey it
and the widespread sentiment that it should be obeyed. And as
usual, mainstream jurisprudence has been desperate to come up
with some objective-looking account. All those accounts are very
unconvincing. I think we need to admit that it is a matter of feeling,
of giving a hoot.
When I give a hoot, I feel exhausted or inauthentic or both.26
Gilligan observed, when little Jake and little Amy speak at the same time, Amy's voice
gets drowned out.
Other radical feminists argued that the ethic of care described by Gilligan tended to
reify women's powerlessness, to glorify women's lack of self-esteem in the moral realm
the same way that we have been taught to eroticize submission in the sexual realm. Or
as MacKinnon put it with characteristic pithiness, we're not talking about a brave new
world in a different voice, we're talking about the same old oppression in a higher regis-
ter. See Ellen C. DuBois, Mary C. Dunlap, Carol J. Gilligan, Catharine A. MacKinnon,
CarrieJ. Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Lazo--A Conversation, 34
BUFFALO L. REv. 11, 25 (1985).
24 West, supra note 19, at 20.
25 Id. at 65. I am not suggesting that we have to choose the values of connected-
ness and caring and survival over our individual freedom or well-being or moral agency.
To posit that either set of values must be relinquished in favor of the other is simply to
buy right back into the same destructive dichotomy between self and world.
26 I think that for an individual to feel an obligation to law as it is, she needs to be
convinced of two things. There is plenty of room for dispute in both. First, social orga-
nizations need rules. Society is just too big and pluralistic to establish the patterns and
unspoken norms that suffice in smaller groups. Second, the order established by rules
needs to be able to be counted on, in most or at least in the important instances. So, I
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Two options readily appear. First, we can stagger on holding up
our end. (This is how I felt consulting on a brief in the Webster 27
abortion case: citing cases that were beside the point, relying on
doctrine that no one really believes in, never getting to say what the
point was.) Or we can get mad and tell the government to stuff it,
go in for direct action and try not to get caught (like the government
does). These options correspond to what MacKinnon in 1983 called
feminism's schizophrenic relationship to the state.28 We have oscil-
lated, she said, between liberal trust in a liberal state as potentially
principled, on one hand, and a leftist abandonment of the state on
the other.
I don't think there's any question anymore that liberalism has
backfired, as the Webster case illustrates. I don't think there's much
dispute anymore that the state as constituted is male, in the sense
that it embodies and ensures male control over female sexuality, in
MacKinnon's words, "occasionally cushioning, qualifying, or dejure
prohibiting its excesses when necessary to its normalization." 29
There is the justified fear, therefore, that when we rely on the state
or seek its protection, we feed it and endorse its legitimizing and
normalizing activities. The problem with the leftist position, of
course, is that abandoning the state also means abandoning "those
women whom the state does not ignore or who are, as yet, in no
position to ignore it." °30 Abandoning the state abandons us to un-
checked male power in society.
The development of a feminist political theory must be very
high on our agenda. There are so many important questions here:
whether we believe in the very idea of a state;3 1 whether we must
need to feel that the police will eventually respond to my entreaties; I need to feel that
the government feels obligated to obey the rules it establishes; I need to believe my
rights will be enforced, etc. You see the problem here. The government is not holding
up its end of the bargain. From Iran-Contra to Agent Orange to the failure to restrain
the military in preparation for nuclear war to the nature of rape prosecutions to the
abortion case, government treats its obligation cynically if indeed it will acknowledge an
obligation at all.
27 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (Supreme Court
upheld Missouri law restricting the use of public employees and facilities for perform-
ance or assistance of nontherapeutic abortions).
28 Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 643 (1983).
29 Id. at 644.
30 Id. at 649.
31 The state as constituted and understood just doesn't have very much to do with
us. As Robin West points out, the creation of a state is a very male response to a male
idea of the state of nature. In that male state of nature, all people, meaning all men, are
created equally. They thereby have equal separate personhood, and equal physical force
with which to protect that personhood. Implicit in this realm is the threat of mutual
assured destruction, should they have to resort to physical force to protect their space.
The response to that vulnerability is the creation of a state that required respect for that
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have a theory of human nature; how to deal with the actual inequal-
ity in distribution of resources; what a feminist understanding of
community is; whether there should be rules at all; how rules should
work; whether feminist processes we use among ourselves can serve
in international relations; and whether sovereignty is a concept that
makes sense anymore. We need to get to these questions, but in the
meantime we have to deal with the state as constituted in other than
a schizophrenic way.
I don't think this has to be so hard. I think we make it hard by
internalizing the logic of the fathers that says we have to be consis-
tent in their linear terms, and that we have to believe in the state in
order to use it. To throw an all or nothing choice at us is to say we
can't tell the difference between oppression and liberation. We can.
We can resist the pressure to idealize the state, and rights, and law.
The issue is knowing the difference in a particular case. The issue is
knowing that we can trust ourselves to do that.32
This corresponds to what I would say is the third option in our
relationship to law and the state. It is based on the process of recov-
ering from an addiction. It is a matter of critical disengagement that
allows for careful attending to the important things that are going
on, with our abilities and sanity intact. You are probably tired of
hearing about addiction. 33 Indulge the addiction model one more
time, for I think it does help to explain how we become undermined,
ineffectual, and unhappy.
Anne Wilson Schaef, sort of the Grace Slick of the co-depen-
equal freedom and potential force. As West points out, if it makes any sense to postu-
late a state of nature at all, females would not likely presume equality. We're not equal
in physical strength of the kind assumed by the male model, and our experience of life is
of unequal vulnerabilities and strengths. If our response to this natural inequality were
to create a superstructure, it would by definition not be neutral or abstract. West, supra
note 19, at 63.
32 ' People of color have articulated this in their critique of the critique of rights.
Beginning with the centrality to liberalism of "rights," critical legal theory portrayed
rights as powerful tools of legitimation for an unprincipled capitalist regime. Rights, in
that critique, are otherwise indeterminate and meaningless. I understand part of the
"minority critique of the critique of rights" this way: hey, don't talk to us about how
rights are worthless when you've never needed any. Reliance on rights (hence, on the
state) has been a powerful focal point of the civil rights struggle. We know rights can be
used to oppress; but they can also be used to liberate. To say that it has to be one or the
other is to say to us that we can't tell the difference. See, e.g., KimberlM W. Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Patricia S. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals
from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
33 I understand there are now over 2000 twelve-step meetings per week in Los An-
geles alone, and I have heard the criticism that twelve-stepping is just another trendy,
quasi-religious self-improvement hoax. I don't know whether the program has really
become trendy. I do know that, for substance abusers a step away from dying, it works.
I also know that it has nothing to do with religion, and teaches that there are no pre-
packaged easy answers.
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dence movement, has written a book entitled When Society Becomes an
Addict.3 4 Her thesis is that the violent, lying, cheating state of the
world and the widespread malaise among the citizenry constitutes
an addictive system. She defines addiction as anything in our lives
over which we are powerless. Now power is the most addictive thing
ever invented. The government, business, and other agents of "civi-
lization as we know it" are very strung out on power. These entities
can't get around to doing anything they might usefully do because
they are too busy consolidating their own power. Ordinary people
are co-dependent with respect to the power addiction of govern-
ment, where co-dependence is defined as an addiction to another
entity and its problems. We feel, and largely are, powerless with
respect to the big guys' power addiction. So we tolerate it, and
cover for it, and live as if it weren't there. In the parlance, we enable
it.
The manifestations of addictive behavior on both sides are dis-
honesty, denial, self-centeredness, the need for control, and crisis
orientation. Let's just consider these briefly to illustrate.
Dishonesty: It is everywhere-it's our way of life. The promi-
nence of "spin-doctors" in the presidential campaign leaps to mind.
My favorite example comes from corporate America. Pepperidge
Farm Cookies, itself owned by Campbell's-the world's largest soup
company-has opened a product line called the "American Collec-
tion." You can get Nantucket Cookies and Santa Fe Cookies and so
on. The package of each of these states that Pepperidge Farm has
made "classically American cookies," and "that meant making each
cookie one of a kind, with an individual personality all its own. So
[we] gave them rugged, irregular shapes, just as if someone had lov-
ingly shaped each cookie by hand." 35 Dig it. No one made them by
hand. Pepperidge Farm spent millions of dollars earned from us to
design and build a machine that can regularly make the cookies ir-
regular. It's a hoax. And they are bragging about it. And we are
eating cookies and loving it. And "classically American"? You bet.
Multi-layered lies are as American as homemade cookies.
Denial: Denial is the engine of nuclearization. Consider the
concept of "limited nuclear war" (or, as defense strategists call it,
"sub-holocaust engagement"). Consider nuclear weapons produc-
tion. From Hanford to the Savannah River to Rocky Flats, the truth
is that we have been poisoning ourselves for national security. And
the defense industry is admitting and denying in the same breath.
"Ethics in Government" stuff is about denial. Why was it even
34 ANNE WILSON SCHAEF, WHEN SOCIETY BECOMES AN ADDICT (1987).
35 This example is discussed in Joel Achenbach, Creeping Surrealism: Does Anybody
Really Know What's Real Anymore?, reprinted in UTNE READER Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 112.
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imagined that John Tower could be Secretary of Defense? Not be-
cause of alcoholism or "womanizing," but because of his intimacy
with defense contractors. And we, the people, in the name of "real-
ism," enable this, allow the government to get away with it.
Sef-Centeredness: Everything that happens in the world is either
for or against the United States, from the Persian Gulf to Nicaragua.
When tragedy strikes, the sole focus for the evening news is how
many "American lives" were lost. During Grand Slam tennis tour-
naments, the commentators obsess about how many Americans are
left to compete. (Notice how Martina Navratilova almost never fits
this bill. But that's another sad story.)
The need for control: This is the meaning of contemporary life,
and we call it INS, IRS, State Department, abortion, sexual prefer-
ence. The legal expression for the pathological need to control, and
the 'justification" we co-dependents enable, is "the slippery slope."
If I'm allowed to make love with a consenting adult woman, any-
thing goes, and incest has to be accepted. As if it weren't already. If
pornography is recognized as a violation of civil rights, then instant
total censorship will kick in and Bingo-it's a police state. And on
and on.
Crisis orientation: In the lives of addicts, to portray whatever hap-
pens as a crisis is to give the illusion of being alive. In the life of a
government, to portray the president's cold as newsworthy, to make
events out of non-events is an argument that the government is do-
ing something, and diverts attention from what the government is
really doing or allowing. 36
If you accept or will entertain the addiction model, the next
process is recovery. And the first step to recovery is detachment.
Recovery requires radical detachment in the case of chemical depen-
dencies, but a more complex kind of detachment in the cases of
other addictions. That is to say, when it comes to lots of what are
called co-dependent systems, we don't reject the addictive thing.
Food addicts can't give up food, sex addicts don't give up sex,
law/state addicts shouldn't give them up either. Instead, we have to
detach in a way that is radically re-evaluative of the relationship be-
tween ourselves and the addictive thing, person, or process.
Detachment does not mean disengagement. To the contrary, de-
taching in the way I advocate is a way of engaging more authenti-
cally and more effectively. The benefits of detachment from law are
wonderful: conservation of energy, ability to choose battles, thwart-
36 The war on drugs is the best example of this. Lump together all illegal drugs,
whether life-threatening or not, ignore the most pervasive killers, tobacco and alcohol,
turn it into a full time crusade for individual will power, and don't worry about home-
lessness and poverty and the deficit and nuclear war.
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ing build-up of resentment. Detachment eventually gives us the
ability to talk to the adversaries . 7
Such a detachment allows us to recognize our role as lawyers.
The law is not wonderful, does not itself make a better world.
Mainly, the law oppresses people. What we do as lawyers is stand
between the law and the people it is hurting. We arrange breathing
room for people who are being smothered. Once in a while, we assist
those engaged in other political activities; we keep the law off their
backs so they can make a better world. This is the rub in the abor-
tion battles.38 The authors of the brief are argle-bargling about how
to portray the right to privacy as constitutionally sound. I say, fine,
guys, if it works. But the issue in this case is not constitutional in-
tegrity. The issue is women's survival. Calling abortion illegal
doesn't stop abortions. But that's exactly what the Supreme Court
can't understand: that what they say makes no difference in what
people will do. The law can't decide what practices there will be.
The law can only make it easier or harder, can either provide a little
breathing room or tie plastic bags around women's heads.
A legal example of this sort of detached re-evaluation of the
legal process comes from Greenham. In 1984, a group of Green-
ham women came to this country to sue President Reagan, Defense
Secretary Weinberger, and others under the Alien Tort Claims Act
for the unconstitutional and illegal deployment of those Cruise Mis-
siles. The Center for Constitutional Rights in New York City did a
hell of a job, but they got clobbered in the Second Circuit, on the
ground that the nuclear policy of the United States is a political
question, undecidable by the judiciary.3 9 But it was an incredible
success on other levels. Very important research got done and put
in an accessible format. Papers from that case went out all over the
37 Communicating with adversaries takes a lot of work for many reasons. Salient
among them is that the system to which we are addicted doesn't allow detachment as an
option. You're with us or against us. You're involved in law or not. Win or lose. Life
or death. In detaching from the law, we have to first go through a period of being
characterized as spoil-sports. Johan Huizinga distinguishes between cheats and spoil-
sports, and rightly points out that the latter are much more harshly treated. JOHAN Hui-
ZINGA, HoMo LUDENS 11 (1955). A cheat breaks the rules, but at bottom acknowledges
the worth of the game. Ollie North will not be harshly treated, for though he broke the
rules, he did it because he consents to this government and its metarules. A spoil-sport,
on the other hand, not only transgresses the rules, but says openly that they don't mean
anything. This shatters the play world, brakes the magic circle, reveals the contingency
of the game, robs it of its illusion of importance. The spoil-sport must be cast out,
because she threatens the existence of the play community. We have to get called
weenies and run off the playground. This is a risk I'm willing to take, because we are
already characterized that way. Women who act are always subjectivized and character-
ized as unable to play right. See supra note 15.
38 See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
39 Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), a.f'd, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985).
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world, became a model for similar kinds of cases, and a vehicle for
international Cruise Missile education. The Greenham plaintiffs
toured the United States and talked to thousands of Americans who
knew nothing about these governmental exploits. And look-the
missiles are leaving.
Compare what I said earlier about walking away from clients
and their bad investments when the decision comes down. The law
of the fathers wants us to think that what it has to say is the end of
the matter. But is only one stage of the real proceedings, often only
the beginning. A different kind of lawyering must be a matter of
four principles: (1) don't do work you hate, in law school or in prac-
tice; 40 (2) don't represent clients who are doing bad things; (3) try
to engage in a critical and constructive relationship with your clients
and their cause, their aspirations, their vision; (4) take every lawyer-
ingjob as an opportunity to be in a critical relationship with yourself,
and to learn something.4 1
When you have clients with whom you can do that it is a won-
derful experience. It is powerful medicine for solipsism or for any
feelings of lonesomeness or ineffectuality. It is as close as people
ordinarily come to the dream of actually sharing or exchanging ex-
perience, being karmically connected. And it will represent a major
therapeutic reconstruction of law.
Being able to do this requires a deep reservoir of hope and clar-
ity, both of which seem in short supply these days. But there are
ways. In my opinion, Reagan did one wise thing during his presi-
dency: he consulted an astrologer. (Well, he also bought a dog for
Nancy. That was wise.) The presidency requires clarity, readiness,
awareness of currents of change, and of our place in universe.
Whether one believes in the art and power of astrology or not, it is a
healthy ritual. It is a ritualized putting us in our right place: specks
under the stars, participants in, not controllers of, a great cosmic
adventure. God knows, Reagan needed to be out of himself, to be-
come one with his speckness. We all need some means of ground-
ing and contextualizing ourselves. And I think we can do that
happily and constructively only by some apparently irrational
means, by some ritualized assurance, some leap of faith.
When I use words like "faith" and "miracle," I'm not advocat-
ing passivity. I advocate active surrender, and it is only an apparent
paradox. Just as alcoholics must first admit powerlessness in order
to achieve some agency in their lives, we must detach from law in
order to achieve peace with ourselves and clarity in our projects.
40 Mari Matsuda said this at a conference at Harvard in 1987. It has stuck with me.
41 This is another wise comment from Anne Simon, in her talk to my Feminist Legal
Theory seminar.
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There is a mystery in it, something difficult to explain or even un-
derstand. And that is something central to the revolutionary
method of feminism. MacKinnon put it this way:
Feminism affirms women's point of view by revealing, criticiz-
ing, and explaining its impossibility. This is not a dialectical para-
dox. It is a methodological expression of women's situation, in
which the struggle for consciousness is a struggle for world; for a
sexuality, a history, a culture, a community, a form of power, an
experience of the sacred.42
Nor do I advocate religion. We mustn't confuse spirituality
with religion. To do so, I think, is a peculiar disease of white people
(as Grace Paley calls us, especially appropriate here, people of col-
orlessness 43). Rather, I am responding to another false dichotomy,
that between rationality and irrationality. It's a split we see even
among feminists-between "cultural feminists" and some other
kind of feminists, I suppose the rational, political kind. It is false,
because to say that only so-called rational knowledge counts is not
to make the so-called irrational go away, it is only to devalue it.
That is exactly what patriarchy has done to women's traditional
ways. And the feminist critique of patriarchy adds up, I believe, to
an allegation that what counts as "rational" knowledge is simply
male subjectivity, hence male belief, hence male faith-elevated to
the status of objective reality.
How can we possibly account for the pervasiveness and staying
power of patriarchy except by seeing the ideological significance of
ritual?44 Ritual is patterned action-the way culture enacts and con-
firms its values. Look at the available rituals, how pervasive, and
how incredibly effective. Look at the rituals of sex-role differentiation,
wherein, for women, the values enacted and confirmed are that we
are fodder for the cannon, here to be consumed, ultimately irrele-
vant to history. Look at the rituals of education. These, it must be
said, become high church in law school: the importance of author-
ity, our own inadequacy, the competition for grades, law review,
jobs in the "good firms." (What makes them good firms? Do they
42 MacKinnon, supra note 28, at 637 (emphasis added).
43 Grace Paley, quoted in personal conversation between me and Gwyn Kirk.
44 For example, in 1984, the Department of Energy considered an amazing propo-
sal to deal with high-level nuclear waste, which has a minimum half-life of 10,000 years.
The idea was to train and lay the groundwork for perpetuation of what the Department
of Energy called "an atomic priesthood"-persons who by myth and parable and instil-
ling faith could get across the necessity of staying away from dump sites, and who could
still do the job-due to the power of ritual-even if languages disappear and other social
structures become extinct, even if the world as we know it comes to an end. The Albu-
querque Tribune, Nov. 12, 1984, at A-7, col. 1.
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do any good?) Look at the empty and expensive rituals of electoral
politics.
Now, ritual went wrong somewhere in here. The values en-
acted and consolidated by patriarchal ritual are that the self and
others are to be feared, the self and the universe must be rigidly
controlled, and value is given only in exchange for obedience where
we are isolated in silence. 45 But ritual doesn't have to be that way.
Ritual can be an opening to the great forces in life. Greenham is an
ongoing ritual,46 enacting and affirming an unmediated experience.
We need to reclaim ritual-to create ritual. There has to be a way
for us to say to ourselves and our students and our clients, it is okay
for us to be alive, we belong here, this land is our land, regardless of
the allegations of the government or the corporations or the mili-
tary. Here we are today, talking about all the things we are talking
about: sharing hope, passion, communion, a new kind of ritual. It's
a miracle.
Given the world as it is, how is it possible that we can even get
out of bed every morning? If you're a corporate CEO or a Con-
gressman or a law professor, it can be titles, money, power over
others, false glory. For the rest of us it is faith and other inexplica-
ble phenomena: spirit, eros, immanence, being here now, laughter,
enchantment, pleasure, believing that there can be healing. It is an
Experience of Love, and an Experience of Grace.
45 STARHAWK, TRUTH OR DARE: ENCOUNTERS WITH POWER, AUTHORITY, AND MYS-
TERY 66 (1987).
46 Id. at 149.
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